Imperfect competition and quality signalling
WitrynaWe find that incomplete information about vertical quality (e.g., consumer satisfaction) that is signaled via price softens price competition, and that imperfect competition can reduce the degree to which firms distort their prices to signal their types (relative to what a monopolist would do). Witryna1 kwi 1975 · JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 10, 174-186 (1975 Competitive Signalling* JOHN G. RILEY Department of Economics, U. C.L.A., 405 Hilgard …
Imperfect competition and quality signalling
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Witryna1 sie 2005 · We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price competition among firms producing horizontally- … WitrynaAbstract. I study a multi-sender signaling game between an uninformed decision maker and two senders with common private information and conflicting interests. …
Witryna1 kwi 1975 · Abstract With imperfect information about product quality there are incentives for buyers to make use of proxy variables as “signals”, and hence for sellers to invest in the activity of signalling. Witryna1 gru 2012 · We study price competition between two horizontally differentiated credence goods. Two alternative pricing regimes may arise in equilibrium. The …
Witrynaacknowledge the potentially key role of quality within competition enforcement, few agencies have as yet succeeded in incorporating systematically the assessment of quality within their competition analytical processes. Product quality, alongside price, is a key determination of competition in many if not most markets. WitrynaAbstract: We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price competition among firms producing horizontally and vertically …
WitrynaWe find that incomplete information about vertical quality (e.g., consumer satisfaction) that is signaled via price softens price competition, and that imperfect competition …
Witryna1 lut 2015 · Competition, Disclosure and Signalling M. Janssen, Santanu Roy Published 1 February 2015 Business, Economics Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Journal Competition creates strategic incentives for firms to communicate private information about product quality through signalling rather than voluntary disclosure. granby heating products maineWitryna1 lut 2008 · Imperfect Competition and Quality Signalling Authors: Andrew Daughety Vanderbilt University Jennifer F. Reinganum Abstract and Figures We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and... china vinyl one way vision factoryWitryna26 lip 2005 · We find that incomplete information about vertical quality (e.g., consumer satisfaction), which is signaled via price, softens price competition, and that … china vinyl medical exam glovesWitrynaAbstract I study a multi-sender signaling game between an uninformed decision maker and two senders with common private information and opposed interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that is tied to the size of the misrepresentation. granby heating productsWitrynaMarkets where information is imperfect are also typically far from perfectly competitive (as that concept is understood, say, in the models of Arrow and Debreu).1 In markets with some, but imperfect competition, firms strive to increase their market power and to increase the extraction of rents from china vinyl leather upholstery manufacturerWitryna"Imperfect competition and quality signalling," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 163-183, March. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005. " Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling ," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0520, Vanderbilt University … china vinyl plank flooring wpcWitryna"Imperfect competition and quality signalling," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 163-183, March. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. … granby heights condominiums